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Abstract In 1986 an individual transferable quota management system was
introduced into the New Zealand Finfish fisheries. This article describes the ITQ
system and provides an analysis of its successes and shortcomings to date.
Introduction
On October 1, 1986 an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management system was
introduced into the New Zealand finfish fisheries for ail significant commercial species.
For deepwater stocks of some species a quota scheme has been in place longer, since
April 1982; tbis was intended to handle relatively unexploited stocks that came into New
Zealand's purview after the government's 1978 declaration of a 200-mile exclusive eco-
nomic zone.
This study describes the system and analyzes its success and failures.
Origins of Current Management Policy
The introduction of the management policy of ITQs in the New Zealand fishery has been
well described in a number of other papers (see especially Clark and Duncan 1986), so it
is our intention here to be relatively brief.
The legislative background to New Zealand fisheries management begins with the
Fisheries Act of 1908, which remained in force until 1983 and, as amended and devel-
oped over the years, provided the statutory authority for regulatory interventionist poli-
cies aimed at biological protection. For the period up to tbe declaration of the 200-mile
New Zealand EEZ in 1978,the fisheries were small and confined to an inshore domestic
industry operating to a depth of approximately 200 meters, the level of the near conti-
nental shelf. New Zealand jurisdiction initially extended to 3 miles, then to 12. Beyond
this distance, the fisheries were exploited by foreign fishing vessels from Japan, Korea,
and the Soviet Union.
The management of the fisheries during this period went through a series of fiinda-
mental changes, which were confusing to the industry. From 1938 until 1963, the in-
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shore fishery was managed under a restrictive licensing system involving extensive gear
and area controls, and requiring boats to fish from nominated ports. In 1963 the inshore
fishery was completely deregulated. During this period of open entry, the government's
policy was to encourage investment in the fishing industry through investment incen-
tives, capital grants, allowances, and tax breaks. The rapid expansion of the domestic
industry during this period laid the foundations for its further development into the
deepwater fishery following the declaration of the 200-tnile zone. The government's
economic objectives remained unfocused, and its policies encouraged the natural ten-
dency toward overcapitalization.
In 1978 a moratorium on the issuing of rock lobster and scallop permits was im-
posed; two years later a similar moratorium was placed on tbe issuing of new wet-fish
permits. One effect of this change was to put people already involved in fishing at a
disadvantage, since they had paid substantial prices for entry. Anotber, unintended effect
was to insure that fishing effort expanded dramatically, as the controls limited entry but
did not in any way limit increases in effort, which continued apace.
For rock lobsters, a number of separately managed limited entry controlled fisheries
were then established, with nontransferable licenses rationed through a licensing author-
ity. However, although economic objectives were cited as the reason for introducing
limited entry, tbe new policy failed to reduce investment in the fishery. The industry has
blamed much of tbe problem on administrative inflexibility and has called for a review
of management; currently a proposal to bring this fishery into the ITQ program is being
discussed with industry representatives.
Similarly for the finfisheries, it was gradually realized that although setting eco-
nomic as well as biological objectives was important, it was a futile exercise without a
management program effective enough to achieve those objectives.
When the 200-mile zone was declared, the government was faced with developing
management strategies to manage the fish resources of a very large and unfamiliar area.
Initially, the EEZ and inshore fisheries were managed as separate entities. A policy of
limited domestic expansion, joint venture arrangements, and licensing of foreign fieets
was applied to the zone outside 12 miles; tbis approach was natural because of already
existing trading arrangements with nations that had traditionally fished in the outside
zone and because of the fact that the area was already heavily exploited by those nations,
providing little immediate opportunity for domestic expansion.
In 1983 three significant events occurred. First, economic and biological problems in
tbe insbore fishery reached such a critical stage that they could no longer be ignored.
Second, the Fisheries Act of 1983 was passed; it consolidated previous legislation and
introduced tbe concept of fisheries management plans. For the first time in New Zealand
fisbing bistory, recognition was given not only to biological objectives but also to the
goal of encouraging a maximal return from the fishery. The act did not, however,
address the fundamental question of how economic goals could be meshed with goals of
biological conservation, since the latter were traditionally attended by a complex of
regulatory controls.
Third, the government introduced an economics-oriented management system for
deepwater trawl fisheries, based on individual company transferable quotas. The inten-
tion was to put a quota management system in effect for the relatively unexploited
species in the new 200-mile zone before problems developed. This system served later
as a model for management of the stressed inshore species, and its existence made it
easier to persuade fishers of the effectiveness of ITQ-based management.
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hensively and provided for the introduction of the ITQ system in the inshore fishery and
for its broader application to the deepwater fishery. In line with its overall economic
policy, it has been the government's declared intention to bring market forces to bear in
the realm of fishery management. The government initially had some difficulty in ac-
cepting that the introduction of property rights into the fishery constituted a market
solution, but after acceptance the concept was grasped firmly and supported strongly.
The goal was to adopt property rights in a comprehensive manner through the introduc-
tion of individual transferable quotas.
The creation of property rights through tradeable quotas and the reduction of regula-
tory intervention by government are the essential elements of the new policies that have
developed since 1983. The objectives are to allow the industry to respond in an economi-
cally efficient manner to market forces, to compete internationally, increase profitability,
and maximize returns to the nation througb resource rentals.
The ITQ policy grew to its current proportions in gradual stages. Initially, ITQs were
allocated for a period of 10 years and for seven key species. There were nine enterprises
involved, and the quotas were allocated on the basis of prior investment. In 1985 the
government made these quotas valid in perpetuity and brought other species in the
insbore fishery under ITQs, modified by the results of a buyback scheme and adminis-
trative reductions. Fishers who held permits in May of 1985 were advised of their
individual catch by species for the prior 3-year period and could choose two of these
years, the average of which would form the basis for their ITQ allotment. They had the
right to object to these catch histories on the ground of statistical error, changed fishing
patterns, or distortions of their normal catch record due to vessel breakdowns or bad
health. Of 1,800 individuals notified of their catch histories, 1,400 lodged objections. In
due course these objections were considered, fishermen received notification of their in
some cases amended catch histories, and provisional allocations of quotas were made.
These provisional allocations could be amended by the government administratively
reducing provisional quotas among all fishers on a prorata basis, or by fishers offering
quota back to the government, as further explained in the following section. Fishers
dissatisfied with the results may have recourse to a Quota Appeal Authority established
under the 1986 amendment to the Fisheries Act: there were some 1,100 appeals to this
body.'
Buyback Scheme
It is worth dwelling briefly on the reasons for the government deciding to assist adjust-
ment by way of the buyback scheme, the results of which are summarized in Tables 1
and 2. Tbe mismatch of fieet capacity to available catch had tbe potential to be a major
impediment to the introduction of ITQs. General support for the program would suffer if
fisher's allocations were reduced substantially below existing catch levels, and in that
case, too, they would be under economic pressure to catch over their quota. Further-
more, extensive administrative cuts in allocations to provide for the biological security
of the fisheries would not have been spread evenly for the different species and would
therefore have upset the historic catch mix between species, adding to bycatch problems.
Two tender rounds took place. The first was a competitive tender: fishers made bids to
leave the fishery or reduce their effort. This round was successful in establishing for the
government the price levels fishers were seeking to retire quota. However, the fiill reduc-
tion needed for conservation purposes was not achieved, so a fixed price offer—20 percent
below that determined by competitive tender—was made to those remaining. At this328 I. N. Clark, P. J. Major, and N. Mollett
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stage it was clear to fishers that the government was serious in progressing to an ITQ
scheme, so there was a reasonably strong response to the offer. However, the target
reductions were not achieved for a number of species, and at tbis point administrative
cuts were prorated over the remaining quota holders, who were provided with a legisla-
tive guarantee that in the event that the fish stock recover, their administrative cuts will
he restored.
The Quota Management System
The individual transferable quota (ITQ) system became fiilly effective on 1 October
1986. Thirty-two species are currently covered by ITQs, including the original 21 in-
shore and 8 deepwater species covered, plus paua, squid, and mackerel, which were
added as ITQ species effective 1 October 1987. Rock lobster and scallops are currently
being considered for tbe program. It is likely that even unstressed species that are not
commercially significant will eventually be subject to some ITQ management, although
tbe full yield of the fisbery might not be allocated initially. This policy is intended to
control effort diversion and to provide security and tenure to people wishing to develop
littie-known resources.
The fundamental element of New Zealand's quota management system is the individ-
ual transferable quota. The ITQ is a transferable property right allocated to fishers in the
form of a right of harvest to surplus production from stocks.
Most ITQs have been issued to fishers in perpetuity. The quotas issued for the
various species were determined, as discussed above, on the basis of catch histories. But
for about 20 stressed species, the initial quotas were reduced by way of the buyback
program. In the latter balf of 1986, the government paid out $45 million to buy back
15,800 tonnes of finfish species; in 1987, $1.4 million was spent on buying back 260
tonnes of paua (abalone) quota.
When a TAC is increased, additional quota is made available to the industry by
means of a tender round, or for relatively small quantities it is sold on the Quota Trading
Exchange.
The (^ota Monitoring and Reporting System
Catch Landing Log. The system through which quotas are managed is based on three
documents: the Catch Landing Log, the Quota Management Report, and the Licensed
Fish Receivers Return. The Catch Landing Log provides an onsite record; it must be
completed by the skipper of a fishing vessel as soon as a catch is landed. The log does
not have to be submitted at regular intervals, but must be available on demand to any
fisheries officer or examiner. The log may be used to verify both of the other reports. It
provides the following information on fish species landed;
1. date
2. species/area
3. state, e.g., green, gutted, filleted
4. number/container
5. fisher identification number
6. whether wharf sale, or else license number of fish receiver who bought fish
7. greenweight, equivalent330 /. N. Clark, P. J. Major, and N. Mollett
Licensed Fish Receivers Return. The licensed Fish Receivers Return must be submit-
ted to a registration office monthly, or more often if specified, by all persons licensed to
receive fish from commercial fishermen. It shows the quota holder's name and fisher
identification number, and species and greenweights for all fish received. The report is
designed to monitor commercial fish-receiving operations beyond the landing point. It
provides a means of cross checking the quota holders' reports, and vice versa. It makes
receivers as responsible as fishermen and quota holders in monitoring the use of the
resource. Tbis use of the Licensed Fish Receivers Return is one of the significant inno-
vations in the New Zealand monitoring approach.
A fish receiver is defined as any person who receives fish from a commercial fisher-
man for handling or processing. Except for small boatside sales, it is an offense for an
unlicensed person (fish export licenses and fish packing house licenses are recognized)
to receive fish from a commercial fishermen. A license or certificate of registration may
be declined, revoked, or not renewed—subject to appeal—if the applicant or any person
involved in the management of operations bas been convicted of any fishery offense or
been involved in the management of a corporate body that has been convicted of a
fishery offense.
There is a nonrefundable application fee of $200 and a further fee, when a license or
certificate is granted or renewed, of $130 plus $20 per fishing year for each licensed
premise. Evidence must be supplied for each licensed premise that it complies with
applicable health regulations and that tbe holder is capable of maintaining the required
accounts. Unless there are special circumstances, the fish receiver must receive 30
tonnes or more of fish, from three or more New Zealand fishing vessels, each fishing
year.
The Quota Management Report. This is the basic document for the monitoring of har-
vesting rights. It must be completed by the quota holder and submitted to a registration
office every month, or at shorter intervals if specified. It details by area the quantity of
fish caught for each species for which quota is owned or leased.
Some information in the report, such as opening balances and amount of trading in
quota, can be verified from other sources. The remainder of the information can be
checked against the Licensed Fish Receivers Returns, Catch Landing Logs, and other
documentation.
Besides submitting these reports regularly, quota holders must hold for at least 3
years, or longer if requested, certain supporting documentation such as purcbase in-
voices, dockets from fisb receivers, etc.
Since tbe required reports from quota holders, fish receivers, and fishermen can be
checked against each other, all play a part in monitoring the use of the resource. It is the
Licensed Fish Receivers Return that makes this monitoring system different from those
developed in other countries. If financial analysis of the Quota Management Reports and
Licensed Fish Receivers Returns reveals a discrepancy, an exception report is prepared,
and an appropriate investigation is carried out.
Transferability
Let us turn to the crucial element of transferability in New Zealand's ITQ system. This
section discusses its objectives and benefits, the Quota Trading Exchange as the means
of putting it into effect, the first 18 months of data on quota trading, and the implications
of those data.New Zealand's ITQ Management System 331
From a national perspective, three major objectives of management are enhanced by
the transferability of individual quotas.
The first objective is to achieve the optimal number and configuration of fishers,
vessels, and fishing gear to minimize the aggregate real cost of taking any given catch.
The transferabiiity of quotas achieves this as follows. Each fisher's demand price for
quota will be equal (at most) to the net revenue he expects to derive from harvesting that
quota. This is the profitability of tbe marginal quota, as perceived by the fisber. Tbe
opportunity cost to each quota holder of harvesting the given catch will be the market
price of quota traded. Therefore, a fisher will demand or offer to sell quota, in whole or
part, depending on wbetber the net revenue he expects to earn from his last unit of catch
is greater or less than the market price for quota. In this way, quota will gravitate to the
most efficient operators, who will employ the least costly methods of fishing.
The second objective of fisheries management is to achieve a level of catch that
maximizes the benefit to the nation while ensuring a sustainable fishery. This is
achieved, in theory, by the setting of a commercial TAC equal to the sum of individual
quota. In practice, however, consideration should be given to the effect of uncertainty in
fisheries, and fishers' bebavior while harvesting a regulated catch. A fisher's catch for a
period of time is partially determined by tbe interdependence of species and tbeir spatial
distribution. A fisher cannot specifically control the quantity of fish to be captured by his
gear. Therefore, as a fisher approaches the limit of his individual quota holding, prob-
lems will arise involving unintentional bycatch, quota busting, and undercatching of
quota. Together these would amount to a major problem of deviations from the TAC
limit unless free pooling or transfer of quotas between fishers and, to a degree, over time
were permitted.
Another benefit of quota transferability as regards catch levels involves the adjust-
ment of TACs. A trading floor has been established that enables the crown to sell or
purchase quota to adjust the TAC. This may be achieved with minimal administrative
costs, at a price reflecting the social benefits of the adjustment.
A third objective of management is to achieve its goals at minimum cost. Here
transferability has resulted in savings both in the costs of implementation and of enforce-
ment. ITQs were allocated to fishers on the basis of catch histories for selected years;
therefore established fishers would receive a windfall gain and have a vested interest in
seeing the system introduced successfully. So the system was made politically acceptable
at a minimal implementation cost; at some sacrifice, however, as it did not discriminate
between tbe efficiency of operators—as adopting a more efficient metbod of allocation
such as quota tendering would have. However, this problem is self-correcting through
quota trading.
In terms of enforcement costs, as already mentioned, transferability belps make it
possible to maintain TACs. The cost to individual fishers of complying with quota limits
is reduced by transferability, which in turn reduces the cost of enforcement. A fisherman
who has the possibility of buying extra quota may take that option rather than, as he
might in the absence of transferability, simply catching extra fish illegally.
These benefits of transferability may also be interpreted from a fisher's perspective.
First, transferability has allowed fishers to enter and exit the fishery more easily. A
new fisher may enter the fishery by purchasing a minimum of 5 tonnes of quota and may
acquire additional quota as required. Anyone wishing to retire from the fishery may sell
his vessel and quota, separately or as a package, to any New Zealander, at a value
reflecting the market expectation of income that can be derived from that amount of
catch. This has the advantage to established fishers of providing security, and to new332 1. N. Clark, P J. Major, and N. Mollett
fishers of reducing the administrative obstacles to entry. Another advantage is the flexi-
bility gained. Througb trading, fishers may adjust their catch mixes of species and
expand or reduce their commitment to a fishery, in response to changes in prices, tech-
nology, and stock densities.
Fishers who are unable to fish for a period of time may transfer tbeir quota by sale in
perpetuity or by lease, and thereby still derive an income. This translates into reduced
hardship and risk for fishers. Similarly, people who wish to fish only part-time may do
so by leasing quota or trading in small amounts of quota.
A further advantage of transferability is that it allows fishers to disperse some of the
risk associated with uncertain fishing revenues. They can do this by purchasing quota
jointly and thereby pooling the financial risk. Fishers can form contingency contracts to
fish on behalf of other quota owners, or alternatively can make lease arrangements with
quota owners who are less risk averse, thereby transferring much of the financial risk to
the quota owner.
The lack of conditions on the identity of quota owners also has the advantage of
allowing nonfishers to influence the value and distribution of quota. Theoretically, fish
retailers could purchase quota and lease to fishers with conditions guaranteeing sup-
plies of catch, financial institutions could acquire quota as security, recreationists or
tourist guides could purchase quota away from commercial fishers, or private or gov-
ernment conservationists could purchase quota to reduce catches. Some of these antici-
pated activities have begun taking place.
In order to achieve all the advantages listed above, few restrictions have been placed
on trading. A fisher may trade in perpetuity, by lease, by sublease, and with any desired
conditions of contract attached. Retrospective trading (so long as it is restricted to the
current fishing period) and forward trading are also allowed. Thus a fisher who has
caught in excess of his quota may acquire more through retrospective trading, may
arrange to have the catch recorded against another fisher's quota, or may carry over his
catch, up to 10 percent of his holding, into the next period.
The Qjuota Thtding Exchange
A national fish quota exchange has been established on a videotex system to reduce the
transaction costs incurred by fishers in trading quota. This system includes fish quota
brokers and a full quota trading information network.
The trading system was developed by the New Zealand Fishing Industry Board
(which operates the exchange), with the support of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries, the Federation of Commercial Fishermen, and the Fishing Industry Associa-
tion. The extent of the Ministry's obligation was a capital grant for the establishment
of the exchange, which became operational on January 10, 1987, and is overseen by
the New Zealand Fish Quota Exchange Ltd., a company established for that pur-
pose.
Objective of the Exchange. The exchange provides a trading service for selling and
purchasing ITQs. The videotex it uses is designed to establish the exchange botb as a
marketplace and as an intermediary agent for contract transactions. Its objectives, as
paraphrased from the user instruction manual for the videotex, are to allow those who
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facilities for buyers to complete purcbases by depositing partial or full payment with the
exchange (while safeguarding sellers by revealing their identity only after such deposits
are confirmed); and to provide statistical infonnation on the quota market to interested
parties.
The range of statistical information available on the exchange includes:
1. Catch infonnation for all quota species for the fishing year to date.
2. TAC information and the percentage caught of all quota species on a fishing-year-
.to-date basis.
3. Low, average, and high quota trading price information for transfers in perpetuity
and for leases taken on an annual basis.
4. Buy/sell offers for the current month.
5. Advertising facilities for the purchase or sale of fishing gear, vessels, and any
other fishing related goods and services.
Membership in the exchange is through subscription and is available to any person or
company. At the time the exchange was established, it was anticipated that there would
be essentially three types of users: Fish Quota Exchange brokers, independent large-
volume traders, and small-volume traders who use the broker service.
There are currently nine Fish Quota Exchange brokers througbout the country, and
the number will be increased soon. Tbe brokers have a thorough knowledge of proce-
dures and access to a personal videotex terminal, which they use to conduct transactions
for a fee on bebalf of other present or prospective quota holders. The main advantage of
using a broker is to avoid the relatively high cost of renting videotex terminals.
The exchange, now with 75 members, of whom 26 have used the facilities, is funded
by annual membership fees. Tbe cost of joining is an initial application fee of $50 and an
annual subscription fee of $200. There is also a transaction fee of 1 percent of the total
value of quota traded on the exchange; the minimum fee is $25 and the maximum of
$2,000 per transaction, payable whether or not the contract proceeds and is based on the
initial consideration in the event of subsequent negotiations.
Regardless of how or when they take place, all trades, with details of price and such,
must be reported to the New Zealand ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The crown
currently uses the exchange to buy and sell quota, although it also has the option of using
puhlic tender for the purpose.
The exchange operates a Bank of New Zealand holding account, which acts as a
clearinghouse for quota transactions. The potential buyer of quota deposits a payment
into this account within 3 business days after acceptance of his offer is confirmed.
Within 5 business days of payment (to allow check clearance), the exchange will advise
the parties of their respective contract details. The payment, less the transaction fee, is
then transferred fTom the holding account to the quota seller.
The exchange is currently under review because it does not adequately meet all of
the trading needs of the industry. Most trading is done by companies negotiating directly
with each other.
Enforcement
Before the ITQ management system was introduced. New Zealand enforced its fisheries
policies through a standard game warden approach, apprehending lawbreakers and pro-
viding a presence to discourage illegal behavior. Effective management by this method is334 I. N. Clark, P J. Major, and N. Mollett
costly and was seen by the government of New Zealand as inappropriate to the spirit of
the new management approach.
The focus of enforcement was therefore changed. The new role of the enforcement
authorities is not so much policing fishermen as monitoring, following product fiow,
seeking to establish a paper trail from the fishing vessel to retail disposal. Enforcement
activity now takes place more on land than at sea—which is more cost effective—and is
carried out by people who are more auditors than game wardens. Diagrammatically
the information-gathering activity of enforcement can be represented as in Figure 1.
During the first year and a half of the new management system, the emphasis was on
instituting the necessary formal documentation and reporting procedures. Now that the
data and information-gathering systems are in place, the next phase is being
implemented—systems are being developed to evaluate, test, and analyze the informa-
tion. Diagrammatically, this can be shown as in Figure 2.
Enforcement is expected to become easier as the quota becomes concentrated in
fewer hands and restructuring continues. It can also be expected that, gradually, clear
patterns will emerge that will help in enforcement.
Resource Rentals
As noted, the fundamental principles underlying the ITQ system are twofold: to protect
the resource and, within that constraint, to maximize efficiency.
One consequence of the ITQ management system is the generation of economic rent,
wbicb can eitber be taxed away by the government or left in the fishery to be capitalized
into the value of the ITQ. Tbe latter alternative has major disadvantages in terms of
enticing new entrants into the fishery and encouraging speculation.
The New Zealand government adopted the attitude that since the rent was generated
by restricting access to a common property resource, it would be reasonable for the
original "owners" to expect a return on that resource and compensation for the restric-
tions on access. The government held the view that the unearned income from quota
ownership should not become a windfall gain to the quota holder, nor should it be
capitalized into the value of quota.
Accordingly, the decision was made to appropriate the economic rent through the
levying of a resource rental. It would not be relevant to an international readership to
discuss the differences between a tax and a resource rental—suffice it to say tbat the
rental was chosen because of certain constitutional conventions and peculiarities sur-
rounding the introduction, setting, and collection of taxes in New Zealand.
When the ITQ policy was introduced, minimal or token resource rentals were set on
most species in order to establish the principle, but at the same time the government
stated its intention to move progressively to capture most if not all of the economic rent.
The Fisheries Amendment 1986—the legislative authority for the QMS—set out the
following as the main criteria for establishing the resource rental:
1. The value of individual transferable quotas for the species or class of fish.
2. The net returns or likely net returns to commercial fishermen for fish caught,
including any difference in operating costs of foreign-owned New Zealand fishing
vessels and other New Zealand fishing vessels.
3. Any relevant changes in total allowable catches.
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best guide to the economic rent, and therefore should be the determinant of the resource
rental.
However, members of the industry have argued that the quota trading values in the
early period of the ITQ management system do not represent the economic rent, but that
tbese values contain other significant components that invalidate conclusions drawn from
them. For example, it has become clear that many early trades took place at high values
as some fishers positioned themselves in the marketplace; some values relate to an
urgent need to acquire bycatch species; and some trades include vessel and gear.
The government decided nevertheless to use the data available, but attempted to
make allowances for these aberrations. Resource rentals for 1987-1988 were set at very
conservative levels (which did not prevent the industry from protesting that they were
too higb).
The New Zealand fisbing industry bas consistently argued that quota trading data is
inappropriate for setting resource rentals. This has led to long and often vigorous debate
between tbe industry and government. To resolve the problem, tbe two parties have
worked together to find a mechanism that could be used to determine resource rentals in
the longer term.
For 1988-1989 the New Zealand fishing industry and the government jointly carried
out a profitability study of the industry, coupled with a Capital Asset Pricing Model
analysis, to determine a "target rate of return" for the industry.
These two studies, along with the criteria in the Fisheries Act, have been used to
arrive at a method of determining resource rentals. The government has maintained
throughout the discussions that it eventually intends to appropriate the full economic
surplus that exists in the fishery.
Changes in Fishing Industry Structure
The following series of graphs and tables outlines the scale of the existing fishing indus-
try in New Zealand.
Table 3 covers the structure of the New Zealand fleet as of 1986 when the ITQ
scheme was introduced, and shows the way in which the fieet has changed—there are
fewer standard owner-operated vessels of 9 to 12 meters, but more small vessels (owned
by "lifestyle fishermen"—individuals attracted to the fishing life and willing therefore to
accept relatively low returns; some are part-timers) as well as more large vessels (owned
by companies). The table is somewbat distorted because fishermen purchased a large
number of squid jigging vessels so that they could substantiate claims to squid ITQs on
the basis of domestic catching capacity. It is too early to draw any definite conclusions
about the effect of the new management system on vessel numbers and size.
Tables 4 and 5 show tbe respective numbers of quota owners and quota holders. Tbe
tables show that, currently, quota owners tend to hold and use their quotas. Among the
larger quota holders, the fact that there are slightly more holders than owners suggests
that some specialization in investment is taking place. It is not anticipated, however, that
many vessel owners will choose to lease rather than own, as to do so would place the
operation of their vessels in jeopardy, and the market for vessels is rather weak.
The New Zealand catch and its domestic joint venture and foreign components are
illustrated in Figures 3, 4, and 5, which show that total catch has leveled off since 1983.
The large catch in 1977 was due to foreign fishing effort prior to the establishment of the
New Zealand EEZ.T
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New Zealand Fishing Heet 1986 and 1987
Vessels Classified
by Overall Size 1986 1987
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It can also be observed that foreign vessels under charter continue to form a substan-
tial part of the catching sector. It is anticipated that this will continue to be true under the
ITQ system, as the foreign presence enables domestic operators to harvest in the most
efficient manner by choosing between domestic and foreign catching capacity.
Catch Value
An effort has been made to value the 1986 calendar year domestic (including charter
fleet) catch from New Zealand's EEZ by applying an estimated port price prevailing
through 1986 to the respective sector catches of each species. The estimated value of the
1986 catch was $427.1 million (compared to the estimate in 1985-1986 of $442.7 mil-
lion).^ The domestic (noncharter fleet's contribution to this total was estimated at $257
million, or 60 percent of the total value; the foreign charter contribution at $170 million,
or 40 percent of the total. In terms of species, the domestic wetfish catch was estimated
at $137 million, the shellfish catch at $118 million, the charter catch of wetfish at $100
million, and of shellfish (squid only) at $270 million.
In terms of individual species catch values, the highest value catches for the domestic
fleet were orange roughy, snapper, dredge oysters, and rock lobsters; for the charter
fleet hoki, orange roughy, and both trawled and jigged squid. The combined value of
these species for both fleets accounted for nearly 78 percent of the estimated value of the
1986 catch.
T^hle 5 summarizes developments in the fishing industry's major aggregates in the
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by just over 18,5(X) tonnes, an average yearly growth rate of 2 percent—deriving almost
entirely from the eharter fleet's increased fmfish catch.
Measured at the secondary level—processed fish—the value of total production ap-
proximately douhled in the 4-year time-span. Export sales were the major factor respon-
sible for the increase: New Zealand's domestic market is limited and domestic sales
were estimated at about 20 percent of total sales in 1983, but only 16 percent in 1987.
During this period, export sales increased by $348 million, whereas domestic sales
increased by only $38 million.
Investment patterns in the fishing industry have largely reflected changes in produc-
tioti orientation. The expansion in deepwater activity has required increased catching
capacity. Whereas some of that increase has been provided by Charter/joint venture
operations, some of it, as shown in Table 6, has been provided by investment in the
domestic fleet, which rose by $81 million between 1983 and 1986. Meanwhile, invest-
ment in processing facilities increased by just under $50 million. The overall investment
increase of $160 million represents a not inconsiderable achievement, given the exten-
sive restructuring that was taking place concurrently.
The 1983-1986 investment expansion led to growth in employment. There were
2,300 new jobs in the industry—the growth rate was nearly 31 percent. Predictably,
almost all of this growth occurred in the domestic sector, in which "at sea employment"
increased by 800 (30 percent) and "onshore employment" by 1,200 (32 percent). Em-
ployment in the charter fleet increased by 300. Growth in "employment at sea" has been
accompanied by significant growth in on-shore employment, in line with a general ex-
pansion in landings during the period in question.
Current Key Issues
New Zealand's Individual Quota Management system has been in place for 2 years. The
implementation was remarkably smooth and relatively free of problems. But since it is a
new and somewhat radical system, there were bound to be some problems. This section
briefly outlines some of the issues that have surfaced during the first phase of operation.
Bycatch
The most difficult area, as predicted, has been how to handle the bycatch problem. It can
be stated as follows: a fisher will unavoidably catch some fish of species for which he
does not hold quota. Technically this puts him in breach of the law—unless he follows
New Zealand legislation, according to which he must dispose of the catch as directed by
a fisheries enforcement officer. In other words, he must surrender his catch to the
govemment. The issue is how to encourage fishers to land their catch rather than dump-
ing it while discouraging; them from targeting species that are a bycatch but may also be
target-fished.
Three factors are expected to reduce this problem. First, the catch-mix owned or
held by fishers should, over time, allow catch to more nearly match quota held. Second,
some problems that have traditionally been targeted by one method, say gillnetting, will
become bycatch for another method, say trawling. This has already happened in some
New Zealand fisheries. Third, the trading of quota should alleviate the problem.
It has nonetheless been necessary to provide mechanisms to handle the bycatch
problem, in cases where the fish caught are a true bycatch and the above solutions do not00
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apply. The first approach was to require a fisher to forfeit overcatch of a quota species to
the government. This led to dumping of fish and was not really considered a realistic
option.
The second approach allows catch of certain target species to be swapped for other
bycatch species. The list of species involved is limited, as is the ability to trade one for
another This catch-quota trade-off system is not being widely used—it is rather complex
and fishers by and large camiot be bothered with the work involved. It is also likely that
fishers would prefer to catch all of the more valuable quota species rather than surrender
them in exchange for bycatch. It is suspected that many fishers would rather dump fish
than bother with the trade-off scheme.
The Ministry is currently developing realistic surrender prices that will encourage a
fisher to land overcatch or hycatch, but will discourage targeting on species that are both
bycatch and target species.
Overfishing
The system currently being developed to handle overfishing addresses the linked issues
of bycatch and quota balancing.
Overfishing occurs when a fisherman has taken fish that exceed his quota by more
than 10 percent. In these circumstances Section 88 (I)C of the Fisheries Act provides a
defense if the fisher notifies a fishery officer as soon as practicable and disposes of the
fish or surrenders them to the crown in a manner directed hy the officer.
Administrative instructions allow the fisher to be directed to:
1 Purchase or lease additional quota to cover overfishing—by the end of the calendar
month.
2. Have the fish recorded against another quota holder's quota.
3. Trade off quota against other quota species, where this is possible.
4. Surrender the fish to the crown and default the value or a proportion of it to the
crown.
There are a number of problems with the current procedures. The bycatch trade-off
option works only for a limited range of species. Besides, its existence discourages
fishers from managing quota and catching effort effectively or using leave/purchase
options. It can encourage targeting of bycatch species where the mix is inappropriate. It
allows no protection for the TAC.
As for the option of fish surrender, currently fishers who surrender their fish receive
no compensation. This clearly encourages dumping. Setting appropriate surrender
prices, however, is very difficult.
A revised system is needed that avoids the pitfalls in both systems and encourages
fishermen to manage their quota holding and catching effort to avoid overcatching and
thus protect the TAC; to land the excess fish they catch rather than dumping it; and yet
not target species for which they do not hold quota.
A possible mechanism to meet this problem would be to contract a restricted number
of licensed fish receivers to take all surrendered fish in a region. Selection of contract
receivers would be by competitive tender—the surrender price they would pay the crown
would be represented as a proportion of export value, to allow for flexibility in case of
price fluctuations during the year. The contract price for species received by the crown
would reflect the value of the fish, less processor costs and profits, and could be ex-New Zealand's ITQ Management System 347
pected to equate to a fair port price, possibly with a premium representing increased
processor throughput occasioned hy the preferred status given hy the contract.
Under this scheme, a fisher in an overcatch situation would still seek to procure
quota or avail himself of his defense under Section 88 (1)C of the Fisheries Act by
notifying a fishery officer or registrar. On notification of overcatch he would be directed
to land the fish to the contract licensed fish receiver. (If he is remote from any contract
licensed fish receiver, he would be directed to take the fish to an agreed substitute.) The
contract price for the fishwould then be paid into a trust account maintained hy MAFF-
ish (the business group within the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) and a record
would be kept of the species, value, and name of fisher. No payment would be made to
the fisher at this time.
However, the fisher would have until the end of the fishing year to purchase or lease
quota. If he met this deadline, he would not be considered over quota, the surrender
value of the fish would be returned to him from the trust account, and the quota would
be transferred to the crown to offset the catch. If he is unable to make any quota
arrangement to cover the fish, he would forfeit the surrender price to the crown.
This alternative mechanism would provide a fair return to the crown and maintain
effective enforcement controls. It would address industry concerns over fishers being
made to surrender fish when the total TAC has not been fully utilized; it would encour-
age landing of bycatch species; provide penalties by way of total forfeiture if deliberate
targeting occurred and quota could not be bought; and encourage more efficient manage-
ment of quota to avoid forfeiture provisions.
The system being developed would also solve a major problem. Currently there is a
requirement that catch be balanced against quota at the end of each month. A fisher who
has overcaught his quota must either obtain quota to cover his catch before the next
month's landing, or surrender the fish or its value to the government. Even for some
species for which there was unused quota at the end of the first year of ITQ manage-
ment, it has proved difficult for fishers to ohtain quota within the short time limit
required—other fishers have been holding onto quota just in case they may need it
themselves.
Quota Allocation
When it introduced the ITQ management system. New Zealand chose to allocate ITQs in
terms of absolute tonnages of fish. That Is, each qualifying fisher received a specific
tonnage of each species for which he had a catch history. The question has now arisen as
to whether that was the best approach or whether, given the highly variable nature of
some fish stocks, allocations based on a percentage of the TAC would have been better.
Theoretically the percentage approach is better, as it allows for flexibility in the
adjustment of TACs. ensures that the quota holder has certainty over the quota he owns,
and provides various administrative advantages, particularly in relation to bycatch man-
agement.
Initially, the deepwater scheme as introduced in 1982 provided for proportional allo-
cations. However, when quota management was applied to inshore species, the system
was changed; allocation is fixed and the government enters the market to buy back or
sell quota, depending on the TAC assessment. There were three substantive reasons why
this choice was made. First, it was generally thought when the program was introduced
that this approach provided a more certain environment for industry, because the buy-
back provision would compensate for loss of income due to TAC reductions. Second, asI. N. Clark, P J. Major, and N Mollett
TACs were generally thought to be understated, the fixed quota provided a mechanism
for government revenue raising, since increases in tonnage are tendered off. And third,
trading in quota in this way was thought to be the most effective method of obtaining
information to set resource rentals.
In spite of these advantages, enough problems have arisen that it may be necessary to
reassess the mechanism of allocation. It now seems clear that a percentage TAC would
confer more stability on the industry, since under the tonnage system there is no guaran-
tee that when an increase follows a decrease, people will be successful in reoblaining
their former losses in the tender
Furthermore, administrative problems that have occurred in regard to end-of-year
balancing and bycatch would be more readily resolved under a percentage allocation
system.
It is likely that a review will take place in the near future to detennine whether a
changeover is desirable and possible.
Maori Fishing Issues
During the development and early implementation of the ITQ management system, it
was assumed that the position of the Maori people of New Zealand (who comprise
approximately 10 percent of New Zealand's 3.25 million population) and their interac-
tion with the fisheries would be unaffected hy the new management system being put in
place for the commercial fisheries. In fact, it was the explicitly stated intention of the
government that the quota system should not interfere with traditional fishing rights.
Section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act states, "Nothing in this Act shall affect any Maori
fishing rights."
However, recent legal decisions in a number of areas have highlighted Maori claims
to traditional fishing rights. There could be indirect conflicts with the quota management
system, and in some cases with elements of the legislation dealing with conservation.
In relation to fishing the Maori have claimed three things. They have claimed com-
pensation for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi (signed in 1840 between the Maori
chiefs and the representative of the queen of England, which set out the relationship
between the Maori and the colonial power). Second, the Maori have claimed ownership
of most of the fisheries in New Zealand, both traditional and commercial fisheries, on
the grounds that such ownership was confirmed by the Treaty of Waitangi. Third, they
have argued that in terms of the relationship of treaty partners, they should have some
significant role in future fisheries management.
In pursuit of these claims, the Maori have taken a number of court actions against the
government. The effect of these claims was to impose restrictions on fisheries manage-
ment that made it increasingly difficult to manage the fisheries. In addition, the govern-
ment took the view that these crucial issues should not be decided in the courts but
should be discussed and negotiated between the Maori and the government in the spirit
of partnership, as suggested by the Treaty of Waitangi.
Accordingly, a joint working group was established with equal participation hy Ma-
ori and government-appointed representatives, with the difficult objective of arriving at
a negotiated settlement that everyone (the crown, Maori, fishing industry, and recrea-
tional fishers) would fmd acceptable. The working group's proposals tumed out to be
largely unacceptable, and the government then entered into direct negotiations with
Maori representatives.
The government has now proposed that the Maori be allocated 2.5 percent of eachNew Zealand's ITQ Management System 349
TAC per year for 4 years until they own 10 percent of all TACs. In addition, it is
proposed that the courts he allowed to consider the issues related to Maori fishery rights.
The whole matter is still the subject of negotiations and discussion and no final
resolution has been arrived at to date.
Conclusion
New Zealand's ITQ management system, in place for some two years following on from
a limited quota management system introduced in 1982 for some deepwater species, can
be judged already to be successful in that it effectively addresses both the economic and
biological aspects of fisheries management. It will, of course, continue to be subject to
refinement and development in line with the dynamic nature of fisheries conservation,
management, and economics.
Notes
1. As of publication, approximately two-thirds of these had been heard; the balance are
expected to be heard in 1989. Most judgments support the original decision, but in a number of
cases the ministry has agreed by consent to the appeals. 2. Figures throughout this article are in
New Zealand dollars.
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